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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to investigate in which ways multi-level actor cooperation advances 
national and local implementation processes of human rights norms in weak state contexts. 
Examining the cases of women’s rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and children’s rights in 
Bangladesh, we comparatively point to some advantages and disadvantages cooperative relations 
between international organizations, national governments and local NGOs can entail. Whereas 
these Multi-level Actor Constellations (MACs) usually initiate norm implementation processes 
reliably and compensate governmental deficits, they are not always sustainable in the long run. If 
international organizations withdraw support from temporary missions or policy projects, local 
NGOs are not able to perpetuate implementation activities if state capacities have not been 
strengthened by MACs. Our aim is to highlight functions of local agency within multi-level 
cooperation and to critically raise sustainability issues in human rights implementation to 
supplement norm research in International Relations. 
Keywords: cooperation; development; human rights; post-conflict; weak states. 
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Introduction 
In this article, we examine national and local human rights implementation processes in weak states. 
The main argument we bring forward is that, in weak-state contexts, multi-level cooperation 
between public and private actors from different levels and arenas, including international 
organisations (IOs), the national government and local non-state actors, can initiate norm 
implementation processes. These processes, however, can only be sustained if these multi-level 
actor constellations (MACs) strengthen state capacities in the long run and if governments continue 
implementation. Otherwise, norm implementation processes get stalled again after the international 
partners have withdrawn from MACs. We argue that, as long as this ‘vicious circle’ of 
implementation success and failure is not addressed by the intervening IOs, impediments of norm 
implementation processes in weak states, despite preliminary progress, will prevail. 
We draw on a narrow conceptualisation of weak statehood here. Many typologies have 
measured the weakness or strength of states by means of their ability to provide security, the rule of 
law, legitimacy or welfare services (e.g. Schneckener 2007; Tyagi 2012). Lumping together cause 
and effect, however, renders such definitions analytically problematic. Exercising certain functions, 
such as providing legitimacy, are ‘potential outcomes of state capacity, not necessarily coterminous 
with it’ (Kurtz and Schrank 2012: 616–17). We therefore draw on the concept of limited statehood 
(Risse 2011). Weak states, according to this conceptualisation, are internationally recognised as 
sovereign states but are characterised by a lack of capacity to implement and enforce domestically 
central decisions and/or the monopoly on the use of force. Governance in areas of limited statehood, 
according to Risse (2011: 2–3), ‘rests on the systematic involvement of nonstate actors […] and is 
“multilevel governance”, which links the local with national, regional, and global levels’. Our focus 
is on the actor perspective of such cooperative norm governance in weak-state contexts: how do 
MACs emerge, how do they function, how do they transport global norms to local targets and, 
especially, what happens after the international partners draw back? Empirically, we explore these 
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research questions via two exemplary case studies, based on in-depth field research (semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, field observations): one on women’s rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH), the other on children’s rights in Bangladesh. Rather than aiming at 
generalisable outcomes, we delve into the two separate cases, through in-depth analysis (Ragin 
2004: 138), to generate hypotheses for future research. This exploration is significant because 
empirical evidence on multi-level cooperation in norm implementation in the context of weak states 
is still limited. 
Through our case studies, we identify two different forms of MACs: multi-level advocacy 
coalitions that bring international norms into the national political system, thus engaging in the 
national implementation of norms; and multi-level actor partnerships that contribute to transporting 
international norms to the local societal level, thus fostering the local implementation of norms. 
Local NGOs take over different functions within these arrangements. In multi-level advocacy 
coalitions, they contribute to convincing the government to adopt norms. In multi-level actor 
partnerships, they function as service providers delivering rights-related services to the norm 
targets. 
Our research suggests that MACs, in their varying forms, appear primarily in situations in 
which external actors, due to weak-state capacities, contribute actively to the implementation of 
human rights norms. We deem human rights to be particularly conducive to multi-level cooperation 
since they involve not only IOs and states but also local populations (as the actual rights-holders). 
Furthermore, based on the empirical evidence from our case studies, we argue that such cooperative 
efforts only initiate human rights implementation processes but cannot sustain them. Unless 
domestic authorities take over the responsibility to sustain the started implementation process, it 
gets stalled. 
With our research, we address two gaps in the International Relations (IR) scholarship on 
cooperative relations between IOs and local NGOs in implementing international norms. First, the 
local level has not been considered in sufficient depth yet. Therefore, we focus on local agency 
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here, particularly on the participation of local actors in multi-level cooperation. Second, we put 
forward a critical perspective on MACs by raising sustainability questions that have not yet been 
addressed sufficiently by the relevant literature on multi-level cooperation, such as on Transnational 
Advocacy Networks (TANs) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
We chose to focus on women’s and children’s rights as they both represent vulnerable 
populations whose rights are integrated in ‘targeted treaties’ (Alston 2005: 789). International 
treaties on women’s and children’s rights, i.e. the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
belong to the core human rights treaties of the United Nations. With 187 and 193 ratifications 
respectively, they are the most widely (and almost universally) accepted human rights treaties in the 
world (UNTC 2014). The wide acceptance of these treaties among developing and developed 
countries or potential recipient and donor countries makes one assume that cooperation in these 
areas is particularly active. 
BiH as well as Bangladesh are typical cases of weak-state contexts and multi-level 
cooperation that also represent other cases (Gerring 2007: 149) characterised by a post-conflict and 
a developmental situation. In both cases, rights implementation could be initiated but not sustained. 
This means the cases display the same outcome, although there is variation in a number of relevant 
factors assumed to contribute to this outcome. These include the differing functions that local 
partners take in the implementation process and the main strategies applied, the degree of 
institutionalisation within a respective actor constellation, internal coordination procedures, the type 
of actors that initiate MACs, and the implementation phase in which they engage. Due to this 
variation in the intervening variables, one can expect to learn a lot from studying these cases 
comparatively. 
The contexts of both countries are not very conducive to norm implementation, due to the 
weak-state capacities caused by political instabilities and poverty. Bangladesh lacks primarily the 
resources to provide rights-related welfare services, which hinders its capability to implement both, 
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the international conventions it has ratified and pertinent national policies. BiH is characterised by 
weak-state capacities resulting from ethno-political strife, a dysfunctional state structure and scarce 
resources, as well as the international post-war intervention, restricting the state’s ability to make 
and implement political decisions independently. This quasi protectorate situation makes 
intervening IOs powerful partners or opponents of local agents and their requests. However, despite 
these differences in state weakness, we find similar dynamics regarding multi-level cooperation in 
both contexts. 
This article is divided into three parts. The first section introduces the theoretical concepts that 
our considerations are based on. It also situates our study within the existing literature on 
cooperative relations between IOs and local NGOs, which originates from development and peace 
research. Particularly emphasised are the ideas and critical reflections on TANs and PPPs as the 
main concepts utilised for our empirical observations. The following section contains the two case 
studies exploring in-depth these MACs, their emergence and functioning, as well as the 
implementation strategies. In addition, we investigate empirically what happens after IOs withdraw 
their support from MACs. Subsequently, we compare our findings from the two case studies to 
establish similarities and differences, and, finally, we conclude by discussing political and scientific 
implications. 
 
Governing norm implementation 
In this section, we specify briefly the basic concepts that we use in this article. Our empirical 
analysis is embedded in the IR scholarship on norms, norm implementation and norm compliance. 
These research strands concentrate mainly on identifying social mechanisms that foster norm 
compliance. Our objective, however, is to depart from an understanding in which implementation is 
merely governed by state actors – towards more cooperative perspectives. Drawing on research on 
TANs and PPPs, we claim that MACs under participation of local non-state actors contribute 
significantly to norm implementation processes. Considering their potential to compensate 
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implementation gaps in weak states, we argue that MACs deserve more recognition in the IR norm 
research. 
 
The implementation of international norms 
We follow Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein’s (1996: 54) conceptualisation of norms as ‘collective 
expectations about proper behavior for a given identity’. Human rights are special among norms 
since they not only address state governments but also define ‘primarily the relationship between 
the state and its citizens’ and ‘are increasingly invoked as rules governing the behavior of corporate 
and other nonstate entities’ (Schmitz and Sikkink 2013: 827). 
The effect of norms anchored in international treaties has been treated intensively in studies 
on norm socialisation and compliance, which focus either on the process of adopting norms (e.g. 
Checkel 2005; Risse et al. 1999) or on the actors and mechanisms that promote adherence to 
international norms (Schimmelfennig 2002: 405–407). Compliance scholars, accordingly, start from 
the assumption that norms have already been adopted and concentrate on social mechanisms that 
guarantee obedience to these rules. They highlight the conceptual difference between 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness. Due to their interrelatedness, definitional 
demarcations between the three appear to be blurry; nevertheless, they have to be used distinctively. 
Implementation, according to compliance theory, refers to taking measures to transfer international 
standards into national legislation, which usually makes norms from international conventions 
effective in domestic contexts. The concept of compliance goes beyond that, by evaluating whether 
or not these provisions and implemented measures are indeed adhered to. Effectiveness, in contrast, 
corresponds to attaining the objectives codified in the respective treaty and to reducing the problem 
that an international treaty refers to (Jacobsen and Brown Weiss 2000: 4–5). 
We argue that, in the case of human rights norms, transferring international provisions into 
national legislation does not seem sufficient for making them effective for those populations that 
they have actually been made for. Hence, we differentiate between national implementation, 
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according to compliance theory, and local implementation, as a new concept which encompasses all 
measures (and participating actors) necessary for making human rights norms effective for their 
respective norm targets. We do agree that national implementation is a necessary process towards 
norm compliance – particularly by state actors – but we argue that local implementation is needed 
as well – particularly to achieve norm compliance by a state’s citizens. This means that compliance 
(by the state and its citizens) is considered to be the endpoint of both, national and local 
implementation processes. 
Such a differentiation is not entirely new to compliance research. In earlier studies, a number 
of mechanisms fostering treaty compliance, which require predominantly state action and aim at 
national implementation, have been identified. Among them, there are factors like monitoring and 
sanctioning, juridification, and legal as well as civil internalisation (Zürn and Neyer 2005: 191–95). 
In addition to that, a number of authors point to the meaning of compliance management (Chayes 
and Chayes 1998; Jacobsen and Brown Weiss 2000; Tallberg 2002; Zürn and Joerges 2005; 
Mitchell 2007). They usually stress capacity-building including the provision of administrative, 
technological and financial resources to be most relevant. If one considers the legitimacy aspects, 
mechanisms like participation opportunities in rule-making, the social acceptance of regulations 
(Zürn and Joerges 2005: 26) and the impact of public attitudes on overall compliance (Vogel and 
Kessler 2000: 32) become more important. Altogether, however, mechanisms that are addressed at 
the societal norm targets have not yet received much attention in the IR norm research. They will be 
of further relevance in this article, entailed within the concept of local implementation. 
 
Cooperative approaches to norm implementation 
Our article focuses on the cooperation between public and private actors to achieve norm 
compliance. We emphasise TANs and PPPs as different constructs of MACs engaging in rights 
implementation. Whereas TANs exert predominantly pressure on the state to support national 
implementation mainly through advocacy, PPPs engage in local implementation mainly through 
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service provision. In both processes, local agents take over central – albeit different – roles as 
partners in these constellations. However, we also assume a critical perspective that has, until now, 
been neglected in both TAN and PPP scholarship. Despite the fact that critical voices have been 
raised regarding – among others – the asymmetry of power relations between partners, 
astonishingly few scholars have emphasised sustainability issues. Taking this up, we aim to show 
what happens after international partners withdraw their support from human rights implementation. 
Research on TANs focuses primarily on the contribution of non-state actors to international 
norm implementation and reveals the blurring of international and domestic spheres. In their 
seminal study, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 1–2) define TANs as ‘networks of activists’, including 
‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, 
a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services’. They can be composed of a 
variety of international and domestic governmental and non-governmental actors from different 
countries, aiming at changing the policies and practices of governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, corporations, and civil society (Price 2003: 583). ‘One of the primary goals of 
transnational advocacy is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms’ 
(Khagram et al. 2002: 4). TANs, for instance, pressure norm addressees to comply with 
international standards (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 3). They emerge if state structures are blocked for 
the participation of societal actors. Domestic activists then look for allies abroad to raise awareness 
on norm violations in their country and – via those allies – create pressure on their government. 
Thus, it has often been argued that success of transnational activism is easier to achieve in contexts 
in which elites and key decision-makers are concerned about international reputation (Price 2003: 
592–93). Advocacy networks have, according to Keck and Sikkink (1998: 27), proven to be most 
effective on ‘(1) issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a 
short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility; and (2) issues involving legal 
equality of opportunity’, such as human rights, women, children, indigenous peoples, or the 
environment. Their main sources of influence are their authority and legitimacy derived from 
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expertise, reputation, and their widely acknowledged role in bringing information and moral 
concerns to light (Price 2003: 587–90). 
In addition to insights drawn from TANs, we base our observations in the case studies on the 
literature on PPPs. These are institutionalised forms of cooperation between public and private 
actors for the delivery of governance services (Börzel and Risse 2005: 198). In PPPs, both civil 
society and private business actors – in cooperation with governmental partners – take over 
traditional state responsibilities and participate in providing public goods and implementing social 
norms (Huckel et al. 2007: 115). They can be described as ‘hybrid types of governance’ taking over 
functions that have originally been carried out under sole state authority (Schäferhoff et al. 2009). 
One decisive conceptual differentiation of transnational PPPs from other cooperative modes 
of governance is that they allow for (international) non-state actors to be, to the greatest possible 
extent, equal partners in the policy process from agenda-setting to implementing decisions (Huckel 
et al. 2007: 116). This means that PPPs belong to new modes of transnational governance (Abbott 
and Snidal 2009). 
Among various kinds of PPPs, degrees of institutionalisation vary. In highly institutionalised 
PPPs, clear decision-making structures are installed that include bodies, councils, precise rules, and 
defined procedures (Huckel et al. 2007: 140). In addition to these clear governance structures, a 
high degree of institutionalisation goes hand in hand with a precise formulation of tasks, explicit 
delegation of responsibilities to partners, transparent criteria for tendering partners, and the 
evaluation of projects (Beisheim et al. 2007: 258). 
PPPs emerge increasingly in developing and transformation countries that lack the 
capabilities, resources, and administrative capacities to implement norms and enforce political 
decisions (ibid.: 248). To achieve common objectives, they exchange and mutually provide material 
resources, among them money and infrastructure, as well as ideational ones, including knowledge 
and information (Huckel et al. 2007: 118). Thus, partners complement each other’s deficits and 
pursue common goals with combined strengths (Reinicke and Deng 1999: VII, 98). In areas of 
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limited statehood, external capacity-building mechanisms, the institutionalisation of learning 
processes and the strengthening of local ownership through participation of affected actors count as 
success factors for PPP projects (Beisheim et al. 2007: 259–62). PPPs are emerging in an increasing 
number of policy fields, particularly those focused on environmental, health, and social issues. 
The functions of local NGOs within these transnational governance arrangements is of further 
interest here. NGOs definitely cannot be regarded as a ‘monolithic category’ (Beer et al. 2012: 331) 
anymore. Rather, they serve as advocators, service providers and regulators creating standards of 
soft law (ibid.: see also Abbott and Snidal 2009). Their responsibilities as both advocators and 
service providers are of outmost significance in weak states that are characterised by their (formal) 
acceptance of human rights on the one hand and by lacking implementation capacities on the other. 
 
Critical perspectives 
Critical perspectives on TANs focus primarily on asymmetrical power relationships within 
networks and their repercussions for network success, which might be significant in cases of multi-
level cooperation between – formally more powerful – IOs and – often less powerful – local NGOs. 
More powerful actors may serve as ‘gatekeepers’, affecting, for instance, issue emergence within 
networks, or access of other actors (Carpenter 2007: 114–15), raising important questions about 
their representativeness (Sikkink 2002: 306). Buying into international discourses, concerns and 
solutions by weaker parties within a TAN may lead to the depoliticisation of initial concerns 
(Lerche 2008) or to unsatisfying outcomes from the perspective of the local campaign initiators 
(Huelshoff and Kiel 2012). As the critical literature emphasises, network inequalities are caused 
primarily by the disadvantaged position of NGOs based in the developing world. They often depend 
on external funding, resulting in competition (rather than collaboration) between NGOs, differing 
capacities to write grant proposals to attract funding, the undue impact of donors on local agendas, 
and a loss of NGOs’ autonomy from governments and IOs. Donor dependency gives rise to 
commercialisation, professionalisation or corruption, as well as depoliticisation (Beer et al. 2012: 
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328–30; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008; Cooley and Ron 2002; Paffenholz and Spurk 2006: 10–12, 
26; Pouligny 2005: 505; Sikkink 2002: 307–10). Furthermore, IOs and international NGOs 
(INGOs) have been criticised for ignoring local knowledge frequently and for failing to reinforce 
local processes (Pouligny 2005: 502–504). This may entail short-term contributions but does not 
serve political development and local accountability in the long run (Cubitt 2013). Quite the 
contrary, it fosters structural dependency (Wilén and Chapaux 2011: 543). 
Critical voices on PPPs view them as an instance of privatising world politics. They argue that 
such partnerships are dominated by business and for-profit interests at the expense of the common 
public good (Brühl et al. 2001; Andonova 2006: 8), with problematic implications for the policies 
of IOs’ and PPPs’ reputation (Andonova and Levy 2003: 21). 
Furthermore, questions of legitimacy pertaining to transnational partnerships have been 
raised. Scholars problematise the fact that both unelected for-profit and civil-society organisations 
participate in formulating and implementing international rules and standards (Dingwerth 2007: 12). 
Non-state actors’ engagement in policy formulation might – in the face of implementation costs – 
keep standards low and lead to weak regulations (Börzel and Risse 2005: 210). Another argument 
brought forward is that service provision – usually undertaken by the non-state partners – might 
undermine the capacity-building of states that are already weak and will hamper further state 
engagement or even state-building (Batley and Mcloughlin 2010: 148–49). 
Questions relating to what happens to local actors after international partners withdraw their 
support have not yet received much attention in the scholarship on TANs and PPPs. One 
exceptional study by Rodrigues (2011) points out that withdrawal often leads to complete 
demobilisation if local activists do not have the capacities to institutionalise the gains they made at 
the height of the TAN’s mobilisation and if no national organisation provides continuity to local 
activism by mediating between international resources and local needs. This problem will be 
addressed in our case studies in the following two sections. 
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Multi-level advocacy coalitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The intrastate war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992 and 1995, following the breakup 
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ended in an ethnically divided territory and 
society, a dysfunctional state structure and weak state institutions (Bieber 2006). The post-war 
constitution guaranteed political autonomy to the two ethnically relatively homogenous Entities 
(Republika Srpska/RS and Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine/FBiH) and the ten Cantons (of the 
FBiH), into which the country has been divided since the end of the war. At the same time, a 
comprehensive power-sharing approach promoted common state institutions, which have remained 
relatively weak until today. Constitutionally guaranteed veto rights for each constituent ethno-
national group in BiH, i.e. Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, put nationalist parties in a position to block 
frequently the state-wide political decisions, including the decision for a new constitution, which 
would eliminate the dysfunctional state structure (International Crisis Group 2009). The post-war 
intervention has complicated the situation further. The intervening international community 
installed an additional governance layer by appointing a High Representative in 1996, charged with 
overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement, and providing him with far-reaching 
legislative and executive authorities. 
This complicated post-war situation contributed to the marginalisation of women and their 
specific interests in politics and society (e.g. Global Rights 2004; Kvinna till Kvinna 2000; Rees 
2002; Rights for All et al. 2010). Despite these unfavourable starting conditions, a comprehensive 
women’s rights framework evolved. More than thirty new laws, policies and institutions were 
introduced (or amended) between 1998 and 2009.1 An explanation for this substantial policy change 
is the emergence of multi-level advocacy coalitions2 lobbying for the national implementation of 
women’s rights in areas such as political representation, anti-discrimination, and violence against 
women. The cooperation of local women’s groups, national non-governmental and governmental 
women’s organisations and a few allies from INGOs and IOs helped overcome the lacking 
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capacities and commitment of the greater part of the national political elite in BiH to implement 
women’s rights norms, as codified in the CEDAW. 
The former Yugoslavia had already ratified the CEDAW in 1982, BiH followed in succession 
in 1993. The Dayton Peace Agreement integrated the CEDAW in BiH’s post-war constitution by 
referring to it as one of several human rights conventions directly applicable in national law. 
However, the CEDAW’s practical national and local implementation has been hindered until today 
by the lacking capacities and problem awareness of the political elite and the state system, as well 
as by the prevailing gender stereotypes in society (e.g. Global Rights 2004; Rights for All et al. 
2010; UN 2006, 2013). 
Multi-level advocacy coalitions emerged because Bosnian activists had to realise their 
inability to push any policy changes through on their own. After the war, the Bosnian elite 
considered women’s rights issues to be irrelevant to their political concerns (Cockburn 2002; Fagan 
2005). In addition, the intervening international community appeared to be much more powerful 
than domestic governmental institutions (Sali-Terzić 2001), and facilitated access to international 
donors (Stubbs 2000: 25). Women from Bosnian women’s organisations and political parties 
therefore turned to the intervening international community to call attention to the discrimination of 
women. They used contacts with women from IOs and asked them for support.3 The evolving 
cooperation eventually facilitated Bosnian women’s organisations’ access to domestic policy 
processes. 
The most important international allies of domestic women’s rights activists in advocating 
innovative women’s rights policies during the first ten years of the intervention were representatives 
from the Democratization Department of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) Mission, which assisted Bosnian NGOs and politicians in advocating the introduction of an 
electoral gender quota, and from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
in BiH in the fight against violence against women. The INGO International Human Rights Law 
Group (IHRLG, renamed as Global Rights in December 2003) actively supported domestic NGOs 
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in the campaigns for the Gender Equality Law (adopted in 2003) and the FBiH Law on Protection 
from Violence within the Family (2006) (Global Rights 2005). 
The international allies provided their domestic partners with human resources, such as time 
and personnel for lobby activities and the coordination of campaigns, expertise on international 
institutions and political developments in other states, as well as with access to relevant decision-
makers and institutional processes. Furthermore, they contributed material resources, such as 
funding and office infrastructure, and facilitated access to international donors. In exchange, 
domestic non-state actors provided information about the situation at the basis of society and 
culturally specific knowledge, and they contributed legitimacy as internal actors to the joint 
endeavours. 
The multi-level cooperation facilitated framing strategies which enabled domestic activists to 
link their demands with the interests of the Bosnian political elite, particularly in the European 
integration. For instance, they framed their concerns as requirements for BiH’s accession to 
European organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). Furthermore, 
the members of the multi-level advocacy coalitions stressed compliance with the CEDAW. Already 
the very first women’s rights report by Bosnian women’s organisations from 1999, supported by the 
IHRLG, had been designed as a CEDAW shadow report (IHRLG 1999). Particularly within the 
campaign for the protection and, albeit unsuccessful, increase of the electoral gender quota in 2005 
and 2006, the advocacy coalition used the state’s obligation to comply with the CEDAW to add 
emphasis to its claim (Džumhur 2006; Jakšić 2006). Reference to the CEDAW also served as an 
argument in the attempt to secure public funding for shelters for female victims of violence (Dardić 
2008; Petrić 2008). In some cases, the members of Bosnian multi-level advocacy coalitions had also 
been admitted to working groups drafting new gender legislation. Additionally, in this role, they 
used international and European legal norms to assist them in formulating domestic norms and 
policies, such as the Gender Equality Law and the Entity Laws on Protection from Violence within 
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the Family, which in parts are now based on the CEDAW, the EU Directives and the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 
The degree of institutionalisation of the multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH was low. They 
were characterised by informal relationships. Coordination and internal communication were 
primarily based on email lists and telephone contacts (Global Rights 2005: 58). The OSCE 
organised some joint meetings. However, international and domestic NGOs lacked the financial 
means to follow suit. Some NGOs organised smaller meetings or used public events to meet. Joint 
campaigns, however, contributed to the institutionalisation of NGO networks, such as the Gender 
Equality Coalition and RING, which originated from campaigns for the Gender Equality Law and 
against trafficking in human beings. 
Even though the internal coordination was based on a non-hierarchical mode, i.e. the 
international allies did not impose their views on their less powerful domestic partners, the multi-
level advocacy coalitions in BiH were characterised by a relatively strict division of labour. Bosnian 
women’s organisations and politicians had initiated coalition-building and were primarily 
committed to increasing public awareness. Their international allies assisted them in providing 
access to relevant decision-makers within domestic institutions and the international community. At 
the same time, they also advocated independently the concerns of their local partners, most 
prominently on the issue of violence against women (Rees 2002). The international partners also 
undertook the majority of political lobbying and coordination of joint campaigns, such as 
IHRLG/Global Rights in the cases of the campaigns for the Gender Equality Law and the FBiH 
Law on Protection from Violence within the Family. In other campaigns, however, such as the one 
on protecting the electoral gender quota from amendment, domestic actors, still supported by 
international allies, assumed leading roles. 
Multi-level cooperation, then, is not a one-way road. Both sides benefit. Domestic activists 
receive support for their concerns, primarily in terms of human and material resources. Their 
previously unheard voices get access to the policy processes. Their international allies, by 
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cooperating with domestic partners, obtain information required to identify local needs for 
designing appropriate programmes and enhancing their credibility. Given the scepticism about the 
intervention in much of the local population, it is questionable if the international activities could 
have been equally successful without publicly visible support from a considerable number of 
domestic NGOs and some politicians. But these strengths also come along with drawbacks, 
potentially weakening the effectiveness of multi-level advocacy coalitions. 
Even though these coalitions were successful in achieving the adoption of a legal women’s 
rights framework, its local implementation has been limited (Rights for All et al. 2010; UN 2006, 
2013). Two problems have contributed to the shortcomings in local implementation: an unequal 
visibility of coalition partners and the only temporary existence of the coalitions. 
The internationalised framing strategies might have had negative implications for the local 
implementation of the achieved legal framework. The framing of the coalitions’ demands as 
international state obligations, in combination with the participation of international actors, 
produced the impression that the institutionalised achievements were externally imposed (e.g. 
Oslobođenje 2005; Pupavac 2005; Stachowitsch 2006), even though this had not been the case. As 
domestically driven policy processes usually possess more legitimacy in the eyes of the public than 
the externally driven ones, this impression might negatively affect the implementation process and 
prevent the international norms from eventually reaching their local targets. 
Even more importantly, the multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH were only a temporary 
phenomenon. They lost their strength when intervening IOs departed from the country, such as the 
OHCHR in 2007, changed their priorities, such as the OSCE Mission, or were transformed into a 
domestic organisation, such as the Global Rights’ office, which became the domestic NGO Rights 
for All in 2008. Instead, the newly created domestic governmental gender equality institutions 
increasingly assumed the functions of supporting domestic women’s organisations and politicians. 
However, these state institutions suffer themselves from weak administrative and enforcement 
capacities due to lacking human and material, as well as power, resources (Kvinna till Kvinna 2012: 
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13; Rights for All et al. 2010: 5, 8, 37; UN 2013: 5–6). Therefore, they have been less powerful 
partners than the IOs had been. Furthermore, the transfer process has intensified competition for 
scarce resources and communication problems between domestic governmental and non-
governmental actors (Kvinna till Kvinna 2012: 8–9). 
Bosnian women’s groups and NGOs continued to advocate women’s rights. However, most 
of them, due to lack of capacities and external donor dependency, returned to project-related work, 
focusing on counselling, training and income generation for women or raising the awareness of 
other actors as regards gender issues (Kvinna till Kvinna 2006). Only a few groups have conducted 
projects advocating expressly the local implementation of the women’s rights framework; and 
cooperation with IOs has also waned. Some of these projects were either funded by the EU in BiH 
or promoted by the Gender Unit of the UNDP Office in BiH, which, however, soon focused more 
on regional cooperation between governmental gender equality institutions than on local law 
implementation. 
Intra-case comparison of the implementation of women’s rights in BiH over time (before, 
during and after the existence of the described MACs) reveals that multi-level cooperation in weak 
states can be important for initiating a national implementation process but it lacks sustainability. 
Bosnian women’s NGOs already started to advocate women’s rights during and directly after the 
war. However, they had hardly accomplished any change at the political level before they allied 
with representatives from the intervening IOs. Multi-level cooperation strengthened the previously 
weak capacities of local NGOs and governmental agents and, thereby, facilitated the initiation of a 
national implementation process of women’s rights norms. However, the implementation came to a 
standstill after the international partners had withdrawn, demonstrating that, if international partners 
leave local implementation to domestic actors, the process may be stalled if withdrawal goes along 
with a decline of resources and facilitates competition instead of cooperation. But even if the local 
implementation process has already been activated by a MAC, the withdrawal of international 
partners constrains its sustainability as the following case study on Bangladesh will illustrate. 
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Multi-level actor partnerships in Bangladesh 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, formerly known as East Pakistan, was established in 1971 
gaining independence from West Pakistan after almost two decades of a – partly violent – 
commitment to achieve autonomy. Until today, Bangladesh belongs among the least developed 
states in the world, ranking 146th out of 187 countries covered by the Human Development Index 
(HDI) (UNDP 2011). Its reliance on foreign aid is perpetuated continuously by natural disasters, 
such as cyclones, recurring (monsoon) floods, and riverbank erosion (BSAF 2008: 15). The political 
system is characterised by corruption and political instability (Transparency International 2011). 
Although a parliamentary democracy is in place today, and despite democratically functioning 
institutions such as a parliament, free print media, and an official commitment to human rights, only 
very limited accountability can be observed (Feldman and Larson 2004: 14). 
In this context of severe poverty, children are particularly vulnerable. The Child Development 
Index (CDI), an assessment tool for child well-being, ranks Bangladesh 98th out of 143 countries 
with available data (Save the Children UK 2008: 21). Still, child well-being in Bangladesh has 
improved remarkably since the mid-1990s (Save the Children UK 2008: 13). One explanation for 
this progress is the emergence of multi-level actor partnerships that have contributed to the local 
implementation of children’s rights. 
Bangladesh ratified the 1989 CRC in August 1990 and the 1999 Worst Forms of Child 
Labour (WFCL) in March 2001 (Khair 2005: 20). The three very basic rights stipulated in these 
conventions, i.e. the right to basic education and the right to primary health care (CRC; UN 1989: 
Art. 24, 28) as well as the protection from the worst forms of child labour (WFCL; ILO 1999a: 
Art.7.2.a, 7.2.b), will be investigated further in this case study. 
The national implementation of these rights has already reached an advanced stage. 
Bangladesh’s government, as a consequence of its legal commitment to international children’s 
rights, included the right to education and the right to health and nutrition as fundamental principles 
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of state policy into the constitution (Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, modified 
2011: Art. 15, 17), and passed a Primary Education Act in 1990, which made primary education 
obligatory (Primary Education [Compulsory] Act 1990: Art. 3). In 2006, the Bangladesh Labour 
Code entered into force, which explicitly prohibits labour for all children below the age of 14 and 
includes provisions protecting adolescents from hazardous work (Bangladesh Labour Code 2006: 
Art. 39, 40, 42, 44). The Labour Code is the result of a labour law reform that provides for domestic 
law to be on par with the major ILO conventions (Khair 2005: 39). 
Despite this congruence between global norms and national law, however, gaps in local 
implementation prevailed for a considerable period of time. To fill these gaps, IOs responsible for 
promoting respective children’s rights conventions, i.e. the ILO and UNICEF, approached the 
government offering international cooperation for realising the CRC and the WFCL. The ILO’s 
technical cooperation programme, the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour 
(IPEC), planned three major, externally funded, policy initiatives in cooperation with Bangladesh’s 
Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE). One of them, a project called Preventing and 
Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Selected Formal and Informal Sectors in 
Bangladesh (ILO/IPEC/USA) (2000–2004), focused on the systematic elimination of the worst 
forms of child labour in five prioritised formal and informal sectors of Bangladesh, including the 
bidi4 industry, the construction sector, the leather tanneries, match factories, and domestic child 
labour (ILO/IPEC 2003: iv). The project initiative called the Prevention and Elimination of Selected 
Worst Forms of Child Labour in Dhaka City (ILO/IPEC/NET) (2001–2006) focused on abolishing 
hazardous child labour from Dhaka’s informal working sector, which employed around 94 percent 
of children’s work force in Bangladesh’s capital (Bannerman and Berghuys 2008: I). In both of 
these ILO/IPEC projects, children were withdrawn from hazardous occupations and provided with 
education, skills training and health care services. 
Finally, a third policy programme with the ILO involvement was called into life. The 
Bangladesh Garments Sector Projects (ILO/IPEC/UNICEF/BGMEA) (1995–2003) were initiated 
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by the ILO and UNICEF in cooperation with the MoLE, and Bangladesh’s Garment Manufacturers 
and Exporters’ Association (BGMEA). The initiative concentrated on withdrawing and 
rehabilitating children employed in one of the numerous garment factories. The participating 
children received stipends as income compensation and became integrated into particular project 
schools (ILO/IPEC 2004a: 50). 
In addition to that, UNICEF launched a large-scale programme with the objective of 
implementing the right to primary education for children engaged in hazardous child labour. The 
Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children Project (BEHTRUWC) (1997–2012) 
was founded in cooperation with Bangladesh’s Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPME) 
and offered non-formal education to children that continued working (GoB and DNFE 2002: i). 
In all of these cases, the ILO and UNICEF contracted local NGOs to conduct the norm 
implementation process on the ground. They selected NGOs as project partners on the basis of their 
management capacities, expertise in providing rights-related services, previous experience in 
implementing similar projects, access to the target areas and reputation.5 Selected local NGOs 
received a paid contract from the respective international organisation and the ministry in charge. 
Based upon that, they undertook all implementation activities on the ground that directly involved 
the local norm targets, i.e. the children and their families. In this way, multi-level actor partnerships 
between IOs, the national government and local NGOs came into existence. 
A systematic comparison of the projects introduced above, points to basic features of a 
common local implementation strategy that all of these actor partnerships have pursued. First of all, 
they established a local infrastructure through which rights-related services, such as schooling and 
health care, were delivered to the children. The BEHTRUWC, for example, during its second phase, 
managed to set up 6,646 learning centres in the urban slums of Dhaka and Chittagong.6 
Second, institutions that manage and administrate this infrastructure became established. They 
coordinated the delivery of protective measures and rights-related services to the norm targets. 
These ‘centre management committees’ were composed of local government authorities, employers, 
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elites, like the Imam or the Mullah, school teachers, social workers and parents. This inclusive 
approach helped to strengthen community ownership for the learning centres. In the case of the 
ILO/IPEC/USA, the programme facilitating committees arranged regular meetings with the NGO 
field workers and the ILO monitors to discuss and solve emerging problems related to project 
operation and service provision.7 These committees turned into institutionalised anti-child labour 
platforms within local society (ILO and IPEC 2003: 19). 
A comparative analysis of all the project mechanisms at stake revealed that compliance 
among the norm targets could best be achieved if a certain combination of regulatory mechanisms 
was in place. Children and their families made use of the rights-related services if these were 
combined with awareness-raising regarding children’s rights and the creation of income-generating 
opportunities for the entire family. In addition to that, projects turned out to be much more effective 
if children were targeted with the help of household surveys. In this way, the project implementers 
directly addressed the children who were engaged in the worst forms of labour, who were out of 
school and without health care (Schapper 2014: 110–16). 
All of the examples shown here can be described as highly institutionalised multi-level actor 
partnerships. They dispose of bodies and councils, like the school management committees, and 
they tender their local NGO partners through open bidding processes via newspaper ads. All of the 
projects are regularly evaluated by independent analysts. Respective evaluation reports provide 
some hard evidence for the success of the programmes installed. Whereas in the Garment Sector 
Projects 8,588 children completed the education programme (ILO and IPEC 2004b: 29), the other 
two ILO projects reached out to about 20,000 children (e.g. Bannerman and Berghuys 2008: 30), 
and the UNICEF programme even supplied 517,150 children, who were formerly out of school, 
with basic education (GoB and BNFE 2008: 13). 
Cooperation of the project partners is characterised by a division of labour. On the basis of 
their knowledge and experience in technical cooperation, IOs usually propose a norm-promoting 
project to a government that requires international cooperation for norm implementation. IOs do not 
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only function as the initiator of such policy projects, but they also design and plan them according 
to their technical expertise. Furthermore, they engage in a project’s supervision, monitoring and 
administration. Governments, of course, have to be willing to cooperate; they have to agree that IOs 
launch a policy initiative within their sovereign territory. Hence, multi-level actor partnerships can 
only emerge within a cooperative state (Mayntz 2009: 43). The government’s own role within these 
partnerships can vary. In both ILO/IPEC projects, it was limited to approving its initiation. In 
contrast to that, the MoPME undertook some of the planning, supervisory and administrative tasks 
within the BEHTRUWC. In the framework of the ILO/IPEC/UNICEF/BGMEA, it even provided a 
substantial part of the financial resources, engaged in capacity-building and monitoring, and took 
over part of the field assistance responsibility. In all cases, local NGOs had to be contracted to 
undertake the bulk of tasks related to local implementation. In the project examples illustrated 
above, they have provided for the establishment of community centres and administrating 
institutions, they have initiated the provision of schooling and health services and they installed 
regulatory measures, such as awareness-raising activities. They are the partners that have access to 
the ground, to the norm targets in urban slums and poor rural areas. Local NGOs are in direct 
contact with the projects’ beneficiaries; they convince them to participate in rights-promoting 
activities, and they make them aware about the meaning of children’s rights. Therefore, cooperative 
partnerships between IOs, the national government and local NGOs combine their strengths to 
compensate governmental implementation deficits. 
Upon a closer look, however, the temporary character of the multi-level actor partnerships 
implies several problems related to sustaining rights implementation. In Bangladesh, the 
programme activities introduced above depended on external funding by donor agencies and had to 
be terminated after a certain project period. Although, initially, IOs had entered into legal 
agreements prescribing a continuation of rights-related service provision, the government finally 
refrained from taking over the established infrastructure and from offering education and health 
services. As a consequence, the learning centres became dismantled after the respective project 
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phases, and children and their families were – despite all awareness-raising activities – again denied 
their rights. A statement of the ILO/IPEC Chief Technical Advisor in Bangladesh demonstrates this 
clearly: 
So that’s why I was so incredibly disappointed that we had to cut down our 
infrastructure, that we had to dismantle it because we had raised expectation levels, we 
had raised value levels […] which will sustain and then you can’t provide it. It’s like 
making people aware but don’t give them the option to do anything with it.8 
Although the initial agreement with the government was that the learning centres, established within 
the framework of the project should keep running on a self-sustained basis, financed by revenues 
from a micro-credit component, the centres had to be closed and abolished. 
In all of the programmes considered here, local NGOs tried to continue delivering rights-
related services beyond the project period. This, however, was only possible for the more capable 
NGOs that received additional funding from other external donors. This also meant, in some cases, 
that NGOs pulled children into their own externally funded projects which were, again, of a 
temporary nature.9 
Hence, donor dependency and lacking governmental commitment led to a situation, in which 
children’s rights implementation could only be temporarily initiated and hardly continued. 
Sustainability was, in the end, prevented by the government itself. The Government of Bangladesh 
was usually certain that new external funding would call new projects into life which would re-
establish infrastructure and re-install rights-related services. This means that next to lacking 
governmental commitment, donors themselves take responsibility for the rights implementation 
processes that are not sustainable. 
Moreover, tendering rights-related project activities and contracting local NGOs fostered the 
growth of service-providing NGOs that lost their critical voice regarding the government’s 
implementation failures. A conflict of interest emerged between their own advocacy functions, i.e. 
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to pressure externally for better implementation policies, and gaining lucrative development 
contracts, i.e. to be implementers themselves internally (Deacon 2007: 94–95). According to the 
statistics published by the government, both the number of approved externally funded development 
projects (not only relating to children’s rights but to other issues as well) and the number of local 
NGOs have increased significantly over the last 20 years. Whereas in June 1990, eight projects 
financed through foreign grants had been approved and 267 local NGOs existed, in 2010, the 
figures were at 1,172 development projects and 2,305 local NGOs (NGO Affairs Bureau 2010). 
These figures reveal a vicious circle: An increasing initiation of externally funded projects leads to 
more contracting between IOs and NGOs. These development contracts continuously bring more 
service-providing NGOs into existence. Although they take over important local implementation 
responsibilities, they only do this temporarily, on the basis of external funding and, as long as the 
government does not engage, without sustainable effects. In the end, this situation perpetuates 
Bangladesh’s dependence on external funding for implementing children’s rights at the local level. 
 
Multi-level actor constellations in weak states 
The identified multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH and multi-level actor partnerships in 
Bangladesh share some similarities but also differ in many respects. The commonalities in the 
implementation contexts, membership and the sharing of responsibilities suggest that MACs 
become increasingly relevant. Differences in their specific functions, the relationship towards the 
state, the strategies and degree of institutionalisation, however, allude to a possible variety among 
these constellations (Table 1). Furthermore, we discuss problems in terms of internal hierarchies 
and limited temporality, challenging these constellations’ contribution to norm implementation. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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MACs take over responsibilities in national and local norm implementation in order to 
compensate for governmental implementation deficits in weak states. They consist of members 
from different levels of governance as well as public and private arenas, including IOs and INGOs, 
domestic politicians and state officials, as well as local NGOs, groups and associations, sometimes 
even private business actors. Local actors are crucial within these constellations as they provide 
their international partners with access to the actual norm targets on the ground. The local partners 
benefit from receiving support and resources for pursuing their goals. 
The members of both constellations divide responsibilities internally in a similar way. While 
international partners assume the majority of coordination activities, local NGOs are responsible 
primarily for awareness-raising and access to the actual norm targets. This division of labour can be 
explained by the diverging availability of resources.10 Local non-governmental actors contribute 
primarily their moral and cultural resources, such as credibility and legitimacy as local actors, 
facilitating access to norm targets, and knowledge on dynamics on the ground. International 
governmental (and non-governmental) actors, on the other hand, have primarily material and human 
resources at their disposal, such as funding, time, expertise and personnel, required to carry out 
campaigns and manage projects. Furthermore, they provide access to domestic governmental actors 
and formal institutional processes (socio-organisational resources). However, this division of labour 
has its drawbacks. The coordination responsibilities of international partners in both cases often 
render the contribution of local actors publicly invisible. Furthermore, they make MACs (and their 
achievements in norm implementation) vulnerable to the withdrawal of support by international 
partners. 
Despite their similarities, MACs can differ considerably with respect to their relationship 
towards the target state, their specific objectives, their implementation strategies and the degree of 
their institutionalisation. In our two case studies, most of these differences depend on one main 
distinction: the different functions of both constellations. While multi-level advocacy coalitions 
focus on advocacy, primarily to promote national implementation of international norms, multi-
26 
 
level actor partnerships focus on service delivery to further local implementation. From this basic 
distinction, several more differences follow. 
Multi-level advocacy coalitions and multi-level actor partnerships differ in their relationship 
towards the target state. Whereas the first address the state directly in the attempt to persuade the 
government of the necessity of demanded reforms, the latter take over the government’s 
implementation responsibilities. In the first case, the domestic government is the addressee of the 
mobilisation and has to be convinced of norm implementation; in the second, it is a partner already 
committed to norm implementation but lacking the required capacities to do so. Compensating the 
lacking governmental capacities in norm implementation, however, does not render the state 
irrelevant. Domestic governmental actors make formal political decisions that advocacy coalitions 
call for, they give their approval if international actors want to intervene in domestic norm 
implementation, and sometimes they also actively participate in MACs. 
The different functions of both types of MACs also affect their choice of strategies. Both aim 
at implementing global norms, but they use diverse strategies to realise that goal. While multi-level 
advocacy coalitions rely primarily on discursive strategies to persuade governments and formulate 
policy drafts, multi-level actor partnerships, by setting up local infrastructure, establishing 
institutions and managing the delivery of rights-related services, engage directly in the activities 
that make legal frameworks effective. The degrees of their institutionalisation also differ. Whereas 
advocacy coalitions coordinate their activities in a rather informal way, partnerships rely on 
institutionalised structures, such as administrative bodies and evaluation procedures. 
Even though both constellations help to compensate governmental implementation deficits, 
their contributions to norm implementation are not without problems. Revisiting the critical 
perspectives mentioned above, MACs are primarily confronted with two challenges: internal power 
asymmetries and their limited time frames. Internal coordination differed in both cases in terms of 
the distribution of decision-making power. Multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH were managed in 
a non-hierarchical way. The multi-level actor partnerships in Bangladesh were structured 
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hierarchically. Hierarchical coordination carries the risk of reproducing hierarchical relationships 
and power asymmetries. Furthermore, the initiators of multi-level cooperation also differed. In the 
case of multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH, primarily domestic non-state actors paved the way 
for collaboration by bringing rights violations to their prospective international partners’ attention. 
In the case of the multi-level actor partnerships in Bangladesh, IOs initiated the projects. 
The main weakness of MACs is that, due to their limited time frame, their contributions to 
norm implementation are vulnerable to international withdrawal. If international partners withdraw 
their support and local partners lack the resources required to uphold political pressure on decision-
makers and to manage newly created implementation infrastructures on their own, norm 
implementation processes launched by MACs often come to a standstill as both case studies 
illustrate. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have investigated multi-level actor constellations in weak states that engage in 
national and local implementation of global norms in cases, in which the state has accepted them 
through ratification of international conventions but lacks the capacities and commitment for 
comprehensive implementation. We have posed the questions of how MACs emerge, how they 
function and what happens if international partners withdraw their support. 
In our two case studies, we have analysed empirically women’s rights implementation in BiH, 
and children’s rights implementation in Bangladesh. Multi-level advocacy coalitions in BiH have 
compensated a dysfunctional state structure and weak governmental capacities caused by conflict, 
war and international intervention. These coalitions have supported national implementation of 
women’s rights norms. As a consequence, basic standards of the CEDAW are now institutionalised 
in BiH’s legislation. However, the local implementation process has been hampered since 
international cooperation partners left. 
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In Bangladesh, multi-level actor partnerships became operative at a later stage of the norm 
implementation process. They emerged in a situation in which basic children’s rights norms of the 
CRC and the WFCL had already been implemented nationally. These partnerships compensated the 
lacking state capacities, expertise and resources in making these rights effective for local targets. 
Through programmes that were targeted directly at the local rights-holders and that incorporated the 
establishment of local infrastructure and institutions as well as the provision of rights-related 
services, multi-level actor partnerships engaged in the local implementation of children’s rights. 
This local implementation process, however, could not be sustained due to the lacking 
governmental commitment after the withdrawal of IOs. 
But what implications do such compensation politics actually have for the respective rights-
holders? First of all, it is good news for them that implementation processes are being initiated. It 
can, however, turn into bad news if these initiatives are not maintained. Due to the fact that MACs 
only institutionalise on a temporary basis, all policy initiatives they have started may simply 
dissolve after a certain period of time. This means that the implementation activities are being 
interrupted or terminated if the government does not take over the responsibility for continuing 
them at this stage. 
Most of the time, local governmental and non-governmental partnerslack the resources to 
uphold political pressure on decision-makers and to manage newly created implementation 
infrastructures on their own. This reproduces a situation of dependency on external donors, 
jeopardising the sustainability of norm implementation processes, particularly at the local level. If 
the government is not capable to take over, the initiated endeavours are stalled, leading to a vicious 
circle of implementation success and failure. Furthermore, this process may contribute to an 
increasing depoliticisation of local NGOs, which strive to secure (external) funding by engaging in 
service delivery rather than in criticising politically the governments, the intervening IOs and the 
external donors. The only exit from this vicious circle seems to be the strengthening of state 
capacities, socio-economic development and long-term funding priorities. 
29 
 
In the light of our results, we can generate four hypotheses pertinent to multi-level 
cooperation for human rights implementation in weak states. First, MACs emerge primarily in 
situations where external actors assume governance functions to compensate for weak state 
capacities. The state thus has to be cooperative, and allow IOs to intervene in its territory, in order 
for MACs to emerge. Local non-state actors take a crucial role in these constellations, ranging from 
advocacy and awareness-raising to the delivery of rights-related services to the norm target group. 
Second, depending on the implementation phase in which MACs act primarily, their function, 
strategies, the degree of institutionalisation and internal coordination mechanisms vary. Third, they 
can only initiate human rights implementation, which has to be continued by the state government 
in order to make it sustainable for local rights-holders. Fourth, state governments only continue 
these implementation processes if their capacities could be strengthened and their commitment 
increased with the help of MACs, which could then contribute to breaking the vicious circle. 
We cannot generalise from the two cases. Their results – due to scarce empirical evidence on 
the implementation of human rights norms in weak states – are still significant. The hypotheses, 
however, need to be tested further by studying other weak states and other types of human rights. 
After we have concentrated on cases, in which rights implementation was initiated but could not be 
sustained, we suggest further research to identify the conditions under which sustainable 
implementation can be achieved, even in weak states. 
 
 
Notes 
1 For a comprehensive list see Jenichen (2012: 78). 
2 We prefer calling this subtype of transnational advocacy networks ‘multi-level’ and ‘coalition’ 
as, first, domestic activists do not have to cross borders to ask for international support and 
cooperate with international allies. The latter are already based in the country as IOs and INGOs 
establish peace operations and domestic offices, increasingly staffed by local professionals. 
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Second, members closely coordinate their strategies within the scope of advocacy campaigns 
and, therefore, constitute a coalition rather than a loose network (Khagram et al. 2002: 7–8). 
3 The reconstruction of the process described in this section is based primarily on semi-structured 
interviews with (former) women’s rights activists and representatives from IOs and 
governmental institutions in BiH conducted by one of the authors in April, May and November 
2006. 
4 Bidis are small hand-rolled cigarettes, usually containing tobacco or herbs, which are very 
common in South Asian countries. 
5 Interviews with Abul Haseeb Khan, Resource Integration Centre, Director (26 May, 2008); 
Aftab Uddin Ahmad, Underprivileged Children’s Educational Programmes, Executive Director 
(25 June, 2008); Ronald E. Berghuys, ILO/IPEC Chief Technical Advisor (19 May, 2008). 
6 Interview with Mohammad Golam Kibria, United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF), Education Section, Education Officer (4 June, 2008). 
7 Interview with Nazrul Islam Miah, ILO, Administrative and Finance Assistant (24 June, 2008). 
8 Interview with Ronald E. Berghuys, ILO/IPEC Chief Technical Advisor (19 May, 2008). 
9 Interview with Rafique Uddin Ahmed, ILO/IPEC/UNICEF/BGMEA Garment Sector Projects, 
former ILO National Project Coordinator (18 June, 2008). 
10 On the concept of resources see Edwards and McCarthy (2004). 
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Table 1. Commonalities and differences of multi-level advocacy coalitions and actor partnerships 
 Multi-level advocacy 
coalitions 
Multi-level actor partnerships 
Implementation context lacking governmental implementation capacities 
Norm context human rights, widely accepted international conventions with 
serious implementation deficits, targeted treaties, addressing 
vulnerable and disadvantaged individuals 
Membership domestic/local and international, public and private 
Division of labour  
(dependent on available 
resources) 
- I(N)GOs: coordination (material, human, socio-organisational 
resources) 
- local non-gov. partners: awareness-raising, information about 
local context and dynamics, access to local norm targets 
(moral, cultural resources) 
- domestic governmental actors: approval, partly also 
coordination, administration and funding 
Function (of local partners) advocacy service delivery 
Main implementation phase national implementation local implementation 
Main strategies  discursive (framing) delivery of services 
Institutionalisation  low (campaigns) high (projects) 
Internal coordination non-hierarchical hierarchical 
Initiator  domestic non-gov. actors IOs 
Main strength  compensation of governmental implementation deficits 
Main weakness only temporary presence, resulting in lack of sustainability 
 
